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Eﬀective policy analysis requires an eﬀective positive model of behavior. In this paper, we
consider some important facts about innovation that have been under-emphasized in previous
models. We introduce a model that considers these facts and test the model on the rigid disk
drive industry during the period 1977-97. Our results lead us to criticize certain features of
antitrust policies and policies governing employee non-compete agreements.
Three facts have been under-emphasized in models of innovation races (Reinganum 1989,
Gans and Stern 2000) and industry evolution (Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994, Klepper 1996,
Filson 2001, 2002, Franco and Filson 2002): First, small ﬁrms rarely grow by attempting
to compete head-to-head with industry leaders in a given product market. Instead, small
ﬁrms grow by diﬀerentiating themselves from current industry leaders.1 For example, small
software ﬁrms do not pursue competition with Microsoft in personal computer operating
systems, word processors, or spreadsheets. Instead, they produce diﬀerent products in an
eﬀort to become leaders in the market for their good.
Second, ﬁrms with the “best” technologies are not always the most proﬁtable ﬁrms or the
ones with the largest market shares. In many formal models of innovation and technology
adoption, ﬁrm size and ﬁrm proﬁts are monotonic functions of a summary technological
“know-how” variable. In contrast, real-world large ﬁrms often appear to have relatively
mediocre technology compared to their smaller competitors. Marketing and connections
with important buyers often appear to trump technological know-how.
Third, many resources are mobile. This implies that small high-tech ﬁrms can be im-
portant even when they do not grow large. Models where employees leave existing ﬁrms to
create new “spin-out” ﬁrms have been developed and tested by Franco and Filson (2002)
and Klepper and Sleeper (2002). Acquisitions and licensing are also important in many
industries (Salant 1984, Gans and Stern 2000). Large ﬁrms may acquire innovative small
ﬁrms or license from them, as in the biotechnology industry.
We adapt the standard single-prize racing model (Reinganum 1989) to allow for product
1Some attempts to formally explain diﬀerent innovation strategies exist, such as Nelson (1988) and Eeck-
hout and Jovanovic (2002). However, the distinction between strategies is typically quite simple, such as
that between “innovators” and “followers.”
2diﬀerentiation, spin-out formation, and licensing. Doing so yields a richer description of
initial industry conditions, outcomes, and policy impacts than previous models. Innovation
involves new products instead of the cost reductions that are typically analyzed in racing
models. This facilitates our empirical analysis, which focuses on product innovation. We
consider two types of innovation: quality improvements and new product generations. Dis-
tinguishing between the two is useful in many industries. For example, in the computer
industry, mainframes, minicomputers, desktops, laptops, notebooks, and hand-held devices
are all product generations. New generations have diﬀerent impacts on existing goods than
quality improvements. The richness in our model involves some tradeoﬀs. For example, the
model considers only one innovation at a time, and players do not look beyond the current
race. Insights for industries with a sequence of innovations are obtained by considering how
initial conditions at the beginning of each race change as the industry evolves.
Analytical results and numerical computations suggest several intuitive testable hypothe-
ses, and tests on the rigid disk drive industry provide empirical support. First, small ﬁrms
are more likely to market than license when they pioneer a new product generation. Second,
these ﬁrms market quality improvements in an existing generation only when ﬁrms in the
generation are small and the business stealing eﬀects on the older generation goods are small.
These conditions are likely to hold only early in the evolution of the new generation. Small
ﬁrms who improve quality in mature generations proﬁt by licensing instead of marketing.
The results clarify how market share leadership evolves in new product generations. In
general, new generations pass through at most three stages. In the ﬁrst stage, an entrant
or another small ﬁrm pioneers the generation. In the second stage, the leader in the old
generation either wins the race to improve quality in the new generation or licenses the quality
improvement from the innovator. In the third stage, the leader in the new generation either
wins the race or licenses the quality improvement. If the business stealing eﬀect associated
with the new generation is high when it is ﬁrst introduced, then the ﬁrst stage is skipped.
If the business stealing eﬀect associated with the new generation is low when it is ﬁrst
introduced but rises quickly thereafter because of rapid exogenous growth in demand or
rapid quality improvements, then the second stage is skipped.
Our results have implications for antitrust policies. Antitrust policy in the U.S. favors
3competition between many small competitors. High product market concentration and price
markups are causes for concern. The impacts of market structure and ﬁrm behavior on
innovation have been considered in more cases since the introduction of the 1995 Department
of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property, but this consideration appears to have been one-sided. Gilbert and Tom (2001)
present evidence that the consideration of innovation eﬀects has not aﬀected the outcomes of
most cases, but when it has aﬀected outcomes it has led to challenges in more markets and
broader remedies. In contrast, our results suggest that innovation eﬀects should often be
mitigating factors that cause the agencies to permit greater product market concentration
and higher price markups. Persistent concentration and high markups in an environment
with licensing can allow all innovators (including small start-ups) to appropriate a greater
amount of the social beneﬁts generated through innovation. This may lead to more rapid
innovation, which beneﬁts consumers.
Further, our results suggest that analyses of entry barriers and potential competition in
innovation markets should consider barriers to employee mobility and spin-outs (start-ups
founded by former employees of existing ﬁrms). Thus, our paper adds to the recent literature
on policies governing employee non-compete agreements in high-tech industries (Gilson 1999,
Cooper 2001). Under California law, non-compete agreements are not enforced. Most other
states enforce these agreements. Our analysis suggests that non-compete agreements are
socially harmful because they discourage the emergence of small start-ups that can compete
in innovation races and market goods in new product generations.
1.1. Innovation and New Product Generations in the Rigid Disk Drive Industry
IBM introduced the ﬁrst rigid disk drive in 1956. The ﬁrst drives, 14” in diameter, were either
sold in mainframe computers or sold directly to computer users. When the minicomputer
market emerged in the mid 1970’s an original equipment market developed, and disk drive
manufacturers began selling drives to computer manufacturers.
O u ra n a l y s i sc o v e r st h ep e r i o d1977 to 1997. Innovation occurred rapidly during this
period and took three main forms. First, several new product generations were introduced
in the form of smaller diameter drives. When ﬁrst introduced, the new drives served new
4customers; 8”, 5.25”, 3.5”, 2.5”, and 1.8” drives were ﬁrst used in minicomputers, desktops,
laptops, notebooks, and handheld devices respectively. Second, several improvements in
technical features improved storage capacities and access times. Third, several improvements
in design and manufacturing techniques improved costs and reliability.
We focus on the ﬁrst two forms of innovation (new diameters and improvements in storage
capacities within a diameter) because our data is best-suited to address these two. Tables
1-5 examine the top ten storage capacity leaders in each diameter (or fewer if less than ten
make the diameter). Each ﬁrm’s highest capacity drive in each diameter each year is used
to determine the leaders (data sources are discussed in Subsection 3.1). Within the group
of leaders, we focus on three subgroups: old generation manufacturer-marketers are ﬁrms
whose sales exceeded $50 million 1983 dollars for at least three years at some point during
their life and achieved $50 million 1983 dollars for at least one year before the ﬁrm introduced
drives in the diameter; recent entrants are ﬁrms who entered in the past three years and have
not yet achieved $50 million 1983 dollars in sales; new generation manufacturer-marketers
are ﬁrms whose sales exceeded $50 million 1983 dollars for at least three years only after the
ﬁrm introduced drives in the diameter.
In general, the new diameters are pioneered by recent entrants and small ﬁrms and
then two patterns emerge. First, some old generation market share leaders become storage
capacity leaders in the new diameter. Second, some of the early storage capacity leaders
grow to become large manufacturer marketers. The relative importance of each of these two
patterns varies by diameter, but in either case as the new product generation matures the list
of storage capacity leaders and market share leaders becomes more similar. However, some
recent entrants still make the list of storage capacity leaders even as the diameter matures.
Of course, generating product market revenue is not essential for generating value in
high-tech industries. Many small ﬁrms proﬁt by licensing their technology instead. For a
sample of publicly traded U.S. specialized disk drive manufacturers, Table 6 provides simple
OLS regressions of the natural log of market capitalization on market share and a normalized
measure of storage capacity described in Subsection 3.1. The results suggest that market
share leadership and technological leadership have independent eﬀects on ﬁrm value.
Why do small ﬁrms pioneer new generations? Why do some small ﬁrms grow in some
5generations but not in others? What factors aﬀect the rate of old generation innovation
in the new generation? In the next two sections, we introduce and test a simple model of
innovation with diﬀerent product generations. The results explain why technology leadership
is not always equivalent to market leadership and how the two are related over the evolution
of a new product generation.
The model oversimpliﬁes innovation in two main ways. First, it considers only one
innovation at a time. All ﬁrms compete for the same innovation, and the winner can either
license it or market the resulting product. In real markets multiple innovations occur in
sequence and several may occur simultaneously. We implicitly assume that ﬁrms have a
limited time horizon when making decisions or that they cannot forecast beyond the current
innovation. Second, the model has a partial equilibrium setting with a few large incumbents.
Adjusting the technology and market sizes of these large ﬁrms yields testable hypotheses that
relate industry conditions to which types of ﬁrms innovate.
2. The Model
The model is a partial equilibrium model of a single-prize innovation race. Initially, there
are four ﬁrms in the industry, and each produces one good. The product space has two
dimensions: a horizontal dimension (product generation) and a vertical dimension (quality
within a generation). Initially, there are two product generations, A and B,a n dt w oﬁrms
produce in each generation: ﬁrms 1a and 2a produce generation A and ﬁrms 1b and 2b
produce generation B. The goods produced within each generation have diﬀerent levels of
quality: θ2a ≥ θ1a and θ2b ≥ θ1b, where θi denotes ﬁrm i’s quality. Because we lack data on
production costs, our model focuses on product innovation and ignores cost diﬀerences. All
ﬁrms have identical marginal costs of production, c.
Initially, there are two groups of consumers. Two groups is suﬃcient to allow for the
possibility that some consumers tend to prefer goods in generation A while others prefer
goods in B. To simplify notation, we identify each group with the generation its members
tend to prefer consuming. Each consumer purchases at most one good. Consumer i in group
A buys good j in generation A if doing so maximizes i’s utility:
6Uij = αaaθj − pj + εij (2.1)
where αaa is a preference parameter, θj and pj are the quality and price of good j, and εij is
an individual-speciﬁc shock. When consumer i in group A buys a good in generation B, the
good’s quality is weighted by αab. Consumers in group B have parameters αbb and αba. We
discuss restrictions on these parameters below. A consumer can purchase none of the indus-
try’s goods, and this option has an expected utility of zero. Under the standard assumption
in the discrete choice literature that the individual-speciﬁc shocks are independently and
identically distributed according to the distribution e−e
−εij, the probability that a consumer
in group A purchases good 1a in generation A is
λa,1a =
eαaaθ1a−p1a
1+eαaaθ1a−p1a + eαaaθ2a−p2a + eαabθ1b−p1b + eαabθ2b−p2b (2.2)
The other probabilities, λa,2a, λa,1b, λa,2b, λb,1a, λb,2a, λb,1b, and λb,2b, are similar.
There are na consumers in group A and nb in group B.F i r mj’s proﬁts are
π
0
j =m a x
pj
(pj − c)(naλa,j + nbλb,j) (2.3)
All ﬁrms choose their prices simultaneously and in equilibrium every player best responds.
Each incumbent j earns π0
j up to the point where some ﬁrm innovates. In the analysis of
innovation, we consider B to represent the newer of the two product generations; ﬁrms 1a
and 2a produce old generation goods and 1b and 2b produce young generation goods.
2.1. Innovation
Beginning from the initial state, one of two possible opportunites for innovating occurs. First,
there may be an opportunity to improve quality in the young generation: an opportunity to
develop a good in B with quality θ3b > θ2b. Second, there may be an opportunity to pioneer
a new generation C. Denote the quality of the good in C by θ1c. With the introduction
of C, a group of nc consumers who had no demand for goods in A or B enters the market.
These group C consumers value quality in C using the parameter αcc and never purchase
7goods in A or B (αca = αcb = −∞). Consumers in groups A and B value quality in C using
the parameters αac and αbc, respectively.
After the opportunity for innovating occurs, each incumbent can enter the race or not.
If an incumbent enters the race, it pays a race entry cost fe. New ﬁrms may also enter the
race. We assume the new ﬁrms are spin-outs because spin-outs are important in the disk
drive industry, but this assumption is not critical for most of our analysis. Each of the four
ﬁrms can generate one spin-out. This reﬂects the fact that few employees in any given ﬁrm
acquire suﬃcient know-how to found their own ﬁrm. If a spin-out forms, it pays a spin-out
formation cost fs in addition to fe. After entry decisions are made, there are zero to eight
ﬁrms in the race. If no ﬁrms enter the race the industry remains in the initial state.
The race has several features that are standard in the literature (Reinganum 1989). First,
the race takes place in continuous time. This allows us to ignore ties where two or more
ﬁrms obtain the innovation at the same time. Second, once one ﬁrm innovates, the race
is over. Third, the innovation production function is memoryless. Given that no ﬁrm has
successfully innovated, ﬁrm i’s probability of succeeding in the next instant is hi(xi), where
xi is ﬁrm i’s investment in the next instant. Because the race is memoryless, the ﬁrm’s
problem is a stationary one, and the optimal level of xi does not change during the race.
Each ﬁrm i chooses xi to maximize its value.
If ﬁrm j wins the race it has two options. First, j can manufacture and market the
new good. If j does so, all ﬁrms simultaneously choose their prices to maximize proﬁts. In









r from the new good, where r is the continuous time discount rate and the superscript
indicates which ﬁrm markets the innovation. In the case of incumbents, the new product
does not replace the marketer’s old one but simply extends the marketer’s product line.
Alternatively, j can license (sell) the innovation to another ﬁrm. When ﬁrm j licenses
the innovation, it gives up the proﬁts from the new good in return for a one-time payment
from the licensee. Its proﬁts from its orginal good may also change when it licenses because
product market prices depend on who markets the new good. We assume that the licensor
selects the eﬃcient licensee in the sense that there are no further gains from trade. Licensing
8involves a transaction cost fl.2 Denote ﬁrm j’s per period proﬁt from its original good when
ﬁrm k markets the new product by πk
j. Gains from trade must be positive in order for j to






















We assume that the two parties Nash bargain over the gains from trade (net of fl)a n dt h a t
the relative bargaining power of licensors and licensees may be unequal. The outside option


































































where γ measures the relative bargaining power of the licensor.
We focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibria. To compute the subgame perfect Nash
equilibria, we use generalized backward induction.
2.2. Marketing the New Product
In the marketing stage, one ﬁrm has the innovation, either by winning the race or by acquiring
a license. All ﬁrms choose their prices simultaneously. All of the goods are substitutes (cross-
price elasticities are non-negative) and all best response functions are upward sloping. The
ﬁrms choose lower prices than a monopolist would because they ignore the negative impact
of their price reductions on their competitors’ demands. Because of these business stealing
eﬀects, ﬁrms who do not market the new product prefer whoever does to set a high price.
New ﬁrms choose the lowest price for the new product because they do not internalize
any of the business stealing eﬀects. If a new ﬁrm i markets the new product it chooses its
2It is useful to think of the innovation as a prototype of the new product. The transaction cost would










I − c)(naλa,I + nbλb,I + ncλc,I) (2.7)
which yields the ﬁrst-order condition
naλa,I+nbλb,I+ncλc,I−(p
i
I−c)[naλa,I(1−λa,I)+nbλb,I(1−λb,I)+ncλc,I(1−λc,I)] = 0 (2.8)
If an established ﬁrm j markets the new product it considers the eﬀect of pI on the demand
for its original product. This adds the following expression to the ﬁrst-order condition:
(p
j
j − c)[naλa,jλa,I + nbλb,jλb,I + ncλc,jλc,I] (2.9)
Expression (2.9) is positive, which implies that p
j
I exceeds the pI an entrant would choose.
2.3. Licensing the Innovation
In the licensing stage, ﬁrms look ahead and anticipate the outcome of the marketing stage. If
the business-stealing eﬀects are non-zero and the licensing transaction cost is suﬃciently low,
then new ﬁrms never market the new product. There are gains from trade from transferring
the innovation to an incumbent because the incumbent marketer internalizes the business
stealing eﬀect between its original good and the new product. The incumbent marketer
increases the prices of the two goods, which through the best-response functions causes the
other incumbents to increase their prices. The proﬁt of every good rises.
Intuition suggests that gains from trade are exhausted when the ﬁrm who would set the
highest pI obtains the innovation, because the business stealing eﬀects of the new product
are minimized. We do not have a formal proof that this must always occur, but all of our
numerical computations yield this outcome, which implies that if licensing occurs, the ﬁrm
who obtains the license is the one who would set the highest pI. In the discussion that
follows, we assume that this always occurs. Note that this implies that licensing may or
may not preserve leadership in a particular product generation. The ﬁrm who markets the
10innovation would normally be the one that experiences the most negative externality from a
low market price on the innovation. While this would ordinarily be a large ﬁrm, it may be
an old generation or young generation ﬁrm. New ﬁrms never obtain the license.3
Numerical results also show which winners license and which ones market. If fl =0 ,
licensing always occurs unless the ﬁrm who would set the highest pI wins the race. This is
because there are gains from trade. For fl > 0, the gains from trade must exceed fl in order
for licensing to occur. If we list ﬁr m si no r d e ro fh o wh i g ht h e yw o u l ds e tpI,f r o mh i g h e s tt o
lowest, the ﬁrm at the top of the list is the licensee if licensing occurs. The gains from trade
are highest in the transaction where the ﬁrm at the bottom of the list licenses. Thus, if we
begin from a high no-licensing level of fl and reduce the transaction cost, the lowest ﬁrm on
the list (a new ﬁrm) licenses ﬁrst, then as the transaction cost continues to fall eventually
the second lowest ﬁrm licenses, and so on.
2.4. The Innovation Race
In the innovation race ﬁrms look ahead and realize what their payoﬀs will be after licensing
and marketing occurs. For simplicity we assume that the licensing stage takes no time. Each































































3In some industries, new ﬁrms may obtain licenses to help them enter a market. This is optimal only if
the ﬁrm has some complementary assets that will give it a competitive advantage after acquiring the license.
We do not consider complementary assets because they are not important in the disk drive industry: the
most prominent entrants were spin-outs.








i ) (see Reinganum 1989).





















r , and V
j
i =0 .
If no licensing occurs, the replacement eﬀect is highest for spin-outs and laggards 1a and
1b. The new product reduces the proﬁts of all original products because of the business
stealing eﬀects. Thus, πi
i < π0
i for incumbents. The replacement eﬀect is highest for spin-
outs because they have no original good. Industry laggards are hurt less than the leaders
because their goods have smaller demands to begin with. In contrast, the value terms in the
eﬃciency eﬀect (the V i
i − V
j
i ) are highest for the industry leaders 2a and 2b. These are the
ﬁrms that suﬀer the most when a competitor who sets a low pI markets the new product.
Now consider the impact of licensing. First, consider the impact of licensing on the V
j
i
terms, which appear in the eﬃciency eﬀect. Suppose ﬁrm i is the licensee. Then the ﬁrst-
order condition implies that i’s incentive to win the race falls when it can license because
V
j
i rises; ﬁrm i licenses from j only if the value i receives exceeds the value of letting ﬁrm j
market the good. Note that all other incumbents are also better oﬀ when they lose the race
because they prefer ﬁrm i to market the good rather than any of their other competitors
(because i sets the highest pI). Thus, other incumbents invest less. However, the incentives
of a new ﬁrm cannot fall because V
j
i =0 . Thus, when licensing is possible the eﬀects on the
V
j
i terms favor new ﬁrms over incumbents and cause industry investment to fall.
Now consider the impact of licensing on the V i
i terms. If ﬁrm i is the licensee then V i
i
does not change; if i wins the race it markets the new product. If j wins the race and i has
all of the bargaining power, then ﬁrm j is indiﬀerent between licensing and marketing. As a
result, V
j
j does not change. Thus, if the licensee has all of the bargaining power then the V i
i
terms do not change. If the licensor has some bargaining power, then V
j
j rises for ﬁrms other
12than the licensee. This causes ﬁrms other than the licensee to have a greater incentive to
invest. Thus, when licensing is possible the eﬀects on the V i
i terms lead to more investment
as long as the licensors have bargaining power.
2.5. Spin-out Formation and Race Entry
Incumbents enter the race if the value of expression (2.11)m i n u sfe exceeds the value of
expression (2.11)w h e nxi =0 . Spin-outs form if expression (2.11)e x c e e d sfs + fe. If fs
and fe are suﬃciently low, spin-outs always form and all ﬁrms enter the race. As fe rises,
fewer ﬁrms enter the race. As fs rises, fewer spin-outs form. When fe and fs are positive,
there may be multiple equilibria in the race entry stage. For example, it may be optimal for
three ﬁr m st oe n t e rt h er a c eb u ts e v e r a lc o n ﬁgurations of three ﬁrms satisfy the equilibrium
entry conditions. To break ties, we ﬁrst select the equilibria where the number of racers
is maximized. Then within that group we select the equilibrium that maximizes total ﬁrm
value. These assumptions are not critical for our results.
2.6. Numerical Examples
Obtaining analytical results for racing models with heterogeneous ﬁr m si sd i ﬃcult. Chang-
ing a parameter or the identity of the innovation marketer aﬀects the entire vectors of prices
and investments. The systems of equations that determine equilibrium prices and invest-
ments (the ﬁrst-order conditions) consist of several nonlinear equations. These diﬃculties
account for the tendency of the previous literature on racing to explore environments where
either ﬁrms are identical or the diﬀerences are minimized (for example, one entrant and one
incumbent). In this subsection, we present numerical results from our model. We attempt
to choose parameters to ﬁt the rigid disk drive industry.
In the rigid disk drive industry, customers are segmented according to the size of the com-
puters they manufacture. Firms who make small computers cannot substitute a larger drive,
but ﬁrms who make large computers can substitute a smaller drive if storage capacities and
prices favor doing so. In the data, we measure storage capacities using areal densities, which
measure how much information can be stored on each square inch of disk. To convert areal
density to megabytes we compute aiπ(di
2 )2, where ai is the drive’s areal density, measured in
13megabytes per square inch and di is the diameter of the drive. This implies that to compare
areal densities across diameters, large-computer manufacturers will weight the areal density
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2.5/3.5, 1.8/2.5) is roughly 0.66. Given this,
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(2.14)
We set c =1 ,r= .04,f e =0 ,f s =0 ,f l =5 0 , γ = .5, and θ1a =1 . The other qualities are
functions of θ1a. For example, θ1b = ω∗θ1a, where ω is a constant. The average areal density
in a small diameter drive is 25% greater than that of a large diameter drive, so as a base
case we set ω equal to 1.25. We will consider the eﬀects of changing ω below. To compute
θ2a and θ2b, we compute the ratio of the highest areal density in a given diameter to the
average areal density in that diameter on an annual basis. The ratio gives us an estimate
of the gap between the storage capacity leader and a typical follower. On average (across
diameters and years), the areal density of the leader is twice that of the areal density of the
average ﬁr m .T h i si m p l i e st h a tθ2a =2∗θ1a and θ2b =2∗θ1b. On average, the highest areal
density improves by 50% each year. Given this, θ3b = θ2b ∗ 1.5. The highest areal density of
a new product generation drive in the year it is introduced is roughly equal to the highest
areal density of the adjacent larger diameter drive that year, so we set θ1c = θ2b.
We need to specify na, nb,a n dnc. These values represent the size of the main customer
base for each product generation. We set na =1 0 0 . As product generation B matures, nb
rises relative to na because of exogenous growth in the demand for smaller computers. We
consider the eﬀect of increasing nb on the equilibrium of the game in order to obtain testable
hypotheses about the impact of the age of the product generation on who innovates and
who markets. We note that when a new product generation is ﬁrst introduced, demand is
typically very low relative to the demand for the older generations’ goods.4 Given this, we
4This is typical: new generations take time to diﬀuse before they pose a threat to old generations. In
the disk drive industry, sales of new diameter drives were much lower than the sales of old diameter drives
in the early years of life of the new diameter. For 5.25”, 3.5”, and 2.5” drives, revenue exceeded 2% of the
revenue of larger drives for the ﬁrst time in the fourth year after the drive was ﬁrst introduced. For 1.8”
14set nc =1to focus on cases where nc is small relative to na and nb.
For now, assume that all ﬁrms have the same innovation production function: hi(x)=
αx1/2 for all i. We set α = .01. Increasing a ﬁrm’s α causes it to invest more. Increasing the
scale of all of the ﬁrms’ α’s can aﬀect the results because all of the hi’s rise and the eﬃciency
eﬀect becomes more important. This causes ﬁrms 2a and 2b to invest more.
To obtain testable hypotheses, we consider changes in nb to allow for exogenous growth in
the demand for goods in generation B and we consider changes in ω to allow for improvements
in the quality of B goods relative to A goods over time.
Consider an innovation in generation B. Table 7 shows how diﬀerent values of nb aﬀect
which ﬁrms are most likely to win the innovation race and whether licensing occurs. When
nb is low, spin-outs are most likely to innovate, the old generation leader is next most likely
to innovate, and licensing never occurs. As nb rises, the new generation leader becomes more
likely to innovate. Eventually, when nb is suﬃciently high, the new generation leader and
spin-outs are the ﬁrms most likely to innovate and everyone licenses to the new generation
leader. In general, spin-outs tend to be among the most likely innovators because the re-
placement eﬀect is highest for spin-outs. The eﬃciency eﬀect is highest for the ﬁrm that
experiences the highest business stealing eﬀect, which is either 2a or 2b.
Table 8 shows that increasing the relative quality of the young generation has an eﬀect
similar to increasing nb. We increase ω, which increases θ1b and θ2b.T h i sa ﬀects which ﬁrms
are most likely to win the innovation race and whether licensing occurs. When ω =1 .5,
the old generation leader is most likely to innovate, followed by spin-outs. No licensing
occurs. When ω =1 .75, the old generation leader and spin-outs are still the most likely
ﬁrms to innovate, but now spin-outs license the innovation to the old generation leader. As
ω continues to rise, eventually the new generation leader displaces the old generation leader
as the ﬁrm most likely to innovate, and all ﬁrms license to the new generation leader.
Now consider which ﬁrms are most likely to pioneer new product generations. As long
as new product generations have a small impact on existing generations, then the eﬃciency
eﬀect is low and the most likely innovators are determined by who has the strongest replace-
ment eﬀect. Suppose nb =1 0 . In this case, spin-outs are most likely to pioneer a new product
drives, revenue never exceeded this mark; for 8” drives, revenue exceeded this mark in the second year.
15generation, followed by the laggards in each generation, 1b and 1a, and then the leaders, 2b
and 2a. No licensing occurs. For other values of nb the pattern is similar, as long as the
new good has a small impact on existing goods. If the new good has a higher impact then
the eﬃciency eﬀect becomes more important, and the existing leaders become more likely to
win the race or license from the winner. Which leader has the greater incentive depends on
which one experiences the highest business stealing eﬀect.
2.7. The Know-How Eﬀect and Spin-outs
In addition to eﬃciency and replacement eﬀects, a “know-how eﬀect” may also aﬀect who
wins the race by changing the innovation production function. The know-how eﬀect is that
a ﬁrm with higher know-how has a higher probability of innovating for a given investment,
and the marginal eﬀect of an additional dollar spent may be higher at every point on the
innovation production function. In our model, the high quality ﬁrms 2a and 2b would have
higher α parameters. Their spin-outs may also have high α’s if the spin-outs transfer ﬁrm-
speciﬁc know-how from their parents (Franco and Filson 2002 and Klepper and Sleeper 2002
present evidence that this occurs). The know-how eﬀect also explains why spin-outs may be
more successful than other types of entrants: non-spin-outs lack the know-how of the best
spin-outs. We consider the know-how eﬀect in the empirical analysis below.
3. Empirical Results
3.1. Data
The main data source is the Disk/Trend Report on Rigid Disk Drives (1977-1997). The
dataset contains 193 ﬁrms, 1189 ﬁrm/year observations, and 11644 model/year observa-
tions. Annual sales of disk drives are reported for several ﬁrms.5 The data includes model
characteristics and introduction dates. The level of detail allows us to construct measures of
product quality and keep track of which product generations each ﬁrm produces.
5Sales of other products, including licenses and disk drive components, are not included in the measure
of disk sales. Only sales of drives are counted.
16We measure quality using areal densities. The areal density measures how much infor-
m a t i o nc a nb es t o r e do ne a c hs q u a r ei n c ho fd i s k( m e g a b y t e s / i n 2). To compare across years,
we normalize areal densities using z scores. First, we select each ﬁrm’s highest areal density
d r i v ei ne a c hd i a m e t e ri ne a c hy e a r . 6 Then, for each diameter/year group, we compute the
mean and standard deviation of this best-drive measure across ﬁrms. We use these means
and standard deviations to compute z scores for each ﬁrm/diameter/year measure, and this
is our main quality measure. In tests where the appropriate diameter is not clear, a ﬁrm’s
diameter quality is averaged across the diameters the ﬁrm produces to obtain an average
measure of the ﬁrm’s quality (this is used in Table 6, described in Subsection 1.1).
To test hypotheses about innovation in young product generations, we divide ﬁrms into
old generation ﬁrms and young generation ﬁrms for each adjacent diameter pair: {14”,8”},
{8”,5.25”}, {5.25”,3.5”}, {3.5”,2.5”}, and {2.5”,1.8”}. In each pair, the larger diameter is
the old generation and the smaller one is the young generation. If a ﬁrm produces only
the young drives in a given year it is coded as YPG (young product generation) for that
pair/year; if it produces only the old drives it is coded as OPG (old product generation); if
it produces both it is coded as BOTH.7
To test hypotheses about new ﬁrm success, we distinguish between spin-outs and non-
spin-outs. Spin-outs and their parents were identiﬁed using information in the Disk/Trend
Report, press releases and articles provided by James Porter (editor of the Disk/Trend Re-
port), the Directory of Corporate Aﬃliations, the International Directory of Company His-
tories, and Christensen (1993). There are 40 cases of one or more employees leaving one or
more disk drive ﬁr m st of o u n dan e wﬁrm in the period 1977-1997. To determine the parent
ﬁrms we focus on the background of the founders and not on other employees, for which data
is unavailable. The implicit assumption is that founders had considerable inﬂuence on the
products and strategies of the start-up; evidence from ﬁrm press releases and the Disk/Trend
Report supports this assumption.
6Only drives that have been shipped are used when making these calculations. Drives that have been
announced but not yet put into production (and may never actually be produced) are not included.
7Firms who produce neither the young or the old drives are left out of the analysis of the pair, but this is
irrelevant; such ﬁrms rarely innovate in the young generation. For example, ﬁrms who produce only smaller
diameter drives innovate in larger diameter drives in only four cases in the 20 year period we are examining.
17We focus on U.S. entrants. All but two of the spin-outs are U.S. ﬁrms. We use press
releases obtained through Lexis-Nexis to identify licensing agreements and acquisitions, and
coverage of U.S. ﬁrms exceeds coverage of non-U.S. ﬁrms. We exclude two entrants who make
drives only for their own use. We do not count changes in ownership or name changes as new
entry. We group the entrants into three categories. Those who eventually achieve $50 million
1983 dollars in at least three years are large manufacturer-marketers.T h o s ew h oa r en o ti n
this category but eventually license to or get purchased by a large manufacturer-marketer
are licensors. Those who are not in either category and exit before 1997 are failures.O n l y
one late entrant does not fall into one of these three categories; we exclude it. Although the
ﬁrst two categories do not describe all of the ways entrants might generate value, they do
capture the two ways that our model emphasizes. They also capture the two main types of
success in our data; failures typically exited without generating substantial revenue.
3.2. Quality Improvements in Young Product Generations
We consider quality improvements in young product generations on an annual basis using
probit models. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if, in
a particular year, a ﬁrm introduces a young generation drive with an areal density higher
than the industry-best areal density in the generation in the previous year.8 We consider
only ﬁrms who were in the market in the previous year; this allows us to measure the initial
quality of the potential innovators. The model suggests that the most likely incumbents to
improve quality in the young generation are the leaders in the old and young generations.
The know-how eﬀect reinforces this conclusion, because it implies that high quality ﬁrms are
more likely to innovate. The model also suggests that if leaders in the old generation ever
innovate in the young generation, they do so early on and when the quality in the young
generation is relatively low compared to the quality in the old generation.
The following independent variables are included. We include the ﬁrm’s quality in the
8Thus, we focus on only those ﬁrms who improve on last year’s best quality. This is the type of innovation
our model and most racing models emphasize. Lerner (1997) takes a diﬀerent approach and measures
whether each ﬁrm improves on its own drives each year. He ﬁnds that laggards are more likely to introduce
improvements than leaders, but this mainly measures a tendency of laggards to catch up to leaders, not
surpass them.
18previous year to test the hypothesis that higher quality makes the ﬁrm more likely to inno-
vate. We include the age of the young generation to test the hypothesis that old generation
ﬁrms are more likely to innovate in the young generation early on. To test the hypothe-
sis that old generation ﬁrms are more likely to innovate in the young generation when the
quality of the young generation goods is relatively low compared to the quality of the old
generation goods, we compute the megabytes associated with the highest areal density drive
in each generation each year. Then we compute a ratio
MBYPG
MBYPG+MBOPG for each old/young
pair (discussed in the previous subsection) in each year. As this ratio rises, the quality of the
young generation drive rises relative to the quality of the old generation drives. The lagged
value of the megabyte ratio is included in the probit analysis in order to measure the relative
qualities at the start of the innovation race.
We interact the know-how, age, and megabyte ratio variables with dummy variables that
indicate whether the ﬁrm produces drives in the young generation, old generation, or both.
This allows us to assess whether an increase in age, for example, makes young generation
ﬁrms more likely to innovate. As additional control variables, we include dummy variables
for young and old generation ﬁrms and year eﬀects. Table 9 reports summary statistics.
The results in Table 10 support the hypotheses. Higher initial quality makes the ﬁrm
more likely to innovate, as predicted. This eﬀect is stronger for ﬁrms that produced the young
generation or both in the previous period, but all three eﬀects are positive and statistically
signﬁcant. The marginal eﬀects show that a one standard deviation increase in quality
increases the probability that a ﬁrm innovates by 1.4, 3.7, and 3.9 percentage points for old,
young, and both ﬁrms, respectively. An increase in the megabyte ratio or the diameter’s age
makes young generation ﬁrms more likely to innovate, as predicted. For example, an increase
in the megabyte ratio from .25 to .5 increases the likelihood that an young generation or a
both ﬁrm innovates by 8.2 and 2.1 percentage points, respectively. In contrast, the likelihood
that an old generation ﬁrm innovates falls by 1.8 percentage points. An increase in drive age
of one year decreases the likelihood that a young generation ﬁrm innovates by 0.63 percentage
points, but it decreases the likelihood that an old generation ﬁrm innovates by 2.3 percentage
points. The likelihood that a both ﬁrm innovates rises by 1.8 percentage points.
193.3. New Product Generations
The model suggests that new entrants and industry laggards in the young and old generations
are the most likely pioneers of new product generations. Tables 1-5 provide some initial
support for this view; many of the technology leaders early on are entrants. To analyze this
further, we focus on the ﬁrms Franco and Filson (2002) deﬁne as “early movers” in the new
diameters: ﬁrms that introduced drives in the diameter within the ﬁrst three quarters of
the introduction of the diameter. Table 11 lists these ﬁrms by diameter. For incumbents,
the ﬁrm’s quality in its closest larger diameter in the previous year is listed. For spin-outs,
the parent’s quality in its closest diameter in the year before the spin-out is born is listed.
These quality measures capture the technological position of the ﬁrm (or the parent, where
the spin-out gets its know-how) before the introduction of the new diameter.
The ﬁrst ﬁrms to introduce all of the new diameters were spin-outs: International Mem-
ories, Seagate, Rodime, Prairietek, and Integral Peripherals were the ﬁrst ﬁrms to introduce
8”, 5.25”, 3.5”, 2.5”, and 1.8” drives, respectively. Table 11 shows that the other early pio-
neers were primarily low quality laggards in either the old or young generation. Of the ﬁrms
listed in Table 11, only two, IBM and Control Data, were large manufacturer-marketers with
high quality and high market shares at the time they introduced their drives. On the whole,
the results support the hypothesis: spin-outs and laggards are the main pioneers.
3.4. Entrant Success vs. Failure
The model suggests that exit without licensing or marketing is associated with failure to
innovate. New ﬁrms are more likely to fail when attempting to improve quality in mature
product generations because of the strong incentives the leading incumbents have to win the
race. The know-how eﬀect suggests that spin-outs have an advantage over other entrants.
T ot e s tt h e s eh y p o t h e s e sw ee s t i m a t ep r o b i tm o d e l s .T h ed e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l ei sab i n a r y
variable that takes the value 1 if the entrant experiences either type of success (licensing or
marketing). We include the following independent variables. First, we use the quality of the
entrant’s ﬁrst drive to measure how successful it was in its ﬁrst eﬀort to innovate. Second,
we use the age of the product generation of the entrant’s ﬁrst drive to test for age eﬀects.
20Because 14” drives were introduced long before the beginning of our sample period, we
consider the age of this generation separately, using 1976 as the initial year. Using diﬀerent
initial years for 14” drives has no eﬀect on the results. Finally, we include a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if the entrant is a spin-out. Table 12 reports summary statistics.
The results in Table 13 support the hypotheses. Entrants with higher initial quality are
more likely to experience success. The estimated marginal eﬀects in Equation 1 show that a
one standard deviation increase in quality increases the likelihood of experiencing success by
10 percentage points. Entrants who attempt to innovate in more mature product generations
are less likely to experience success. Equation 1 shows that a one-year increase in the age of
the product generation reduces the probability of success by 11 percentage points. Equation
2 shows the probability of success rises by 25 percentage points if the entrant is a spin-out.
Equation 3 re-estimates Equation 1 including only spin-outs to conﬁrm that quality and the
age of the product generation continue to have the predicted eﬀects.
3.5. Entrant Licensing vs. Marketing
The model suggests that if a new ﬁrm wins the innovation race, there are two possible
outcomes, licensing and marketing. Conditional on winning the race, entrants are more
likely to become large manufacturer-marketers if they pioneer a new product generation or
improve quality early on in a young product generation. Entrants are more likely to license or
be acquired if they improve quality in a mature product generation. To test this hypothesis
we focus on only those entrants who experienced one of the two types of success. The
dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the entrant became a large
manufacturer-marketer, 0 if the entrant licensed. The independent variables are identical to
those used in the previous subsection.
The results in Table 14 support the hypothesis; entrants who innovate in more mature
product generations are more likely to license. Although the eﬀects are statistically insignif-
icant (the sample size is small), the point estimates are large. Equation 1 shows that a one
year increase in the age of the product generation increases the probability that the entrant
licenses by 14 percentage points. Entrants with higher quality are more likely to market, but
this eﬀect is relatively weak. Equation 2 shows that if the entrant is spin-out its probability
21of growing large increases by 11 percentage points. Equation 3 shows the considering only
spin-outs does not change the conclusion about the eﬀe c to fp r o d u c tg e n e r a t i o na g e .
3.6. The Role of Licensing
The model suggests that early in the life of a young product generation, old generation ﬁrms
may improve quality in the young generation by licensing innovations from other ﬁrms,
particularly entrants. Thus, licensing early on is associated with entry into the young gener-
ation. As the young product generation matures, the licensees tend to be ﬁrms who already
produce the young generation’s goods. To test this hypothesis, we sort licensees into those
who did not produce the product generation in the year before obtaining the license and
those who did. The average age of the product generation at the time of the license in the
ﬁrst group is 3.67 years; the average age in the second group is 5.89 years. The diﬀerence is
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This supports the hypothesis.
The model also suggests that licensees are likely to be large. To test this hypothesis,
we note that 55% of the licensees in our sample are large manufacturer-marketers.9 In the
sample of all ﬁrm-year observations, only 36% are large manufacturer-marketers. These
proportions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 5% level. This supports the hypothesis; large
manufacturer-marketers are over-represented in the group of licensees.
4. Policy Implications
In this section we discuss the implications of our ﬁndings for antitrust policies governing
licensing agreements and policies governing employee non-compete agreements. We use our
model to examine the eﬀects of prohibiting licensing and spin-outs. Our empirical results
help clarify the role of licensing and the potential impacts of non-compete agreements.
Racing models typically yield ambiguous welfare results: there may be too little or too
much investment relative to the social optimum. There may be too little because the inno-
9We exclude broad cross-licensing agreements and acquisitions of large ﬁrms from the sample of licenses
because these are not the type of transaction our model emphasizes. Including these would add more
transactions between large ﬁrms. We also exclude a particular type of license that resulted from Rodime
patenting the 3.5” diameter design. All producers of 3.5” drives had to obtain licenses from Rodime.
22vation marketer does not appropriate all of the social beneﬁt from the innovation as long
as consumer surplus is positive. There may be too much because there is a single prize;
the investment of the non-winners is wasted. Each ﬁrm invests without internalizing the
negative externalities of its investment on its competitors (they are less likely to win).
One way to assess the relative importance of these two oﬀsetting factors is to impose
structure on consumer demand, as we have done. Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992)
describe how to compute consumer surplus in a discrete choice model with no consumer
heterogeneity. It is straightforward to extend their approach to the case with three types
of consumers. We assume that utility shocks are i.i.d. with distribution e−e
−εij. The pre-
innovation expected consumer surplus of consumers in group A is





The expected consumer surplus of consumers in group B c a nb ec a l c u l a t e di nas i m i l a r
fashion. Total consumer surplus is the sum of these two surpluses. Adding an extra good
(the new product) adds an additional eαθ−p term to the expression in brackets, and if the
good pioneers a new product generation then the surplus of group C consumers is also added.
The present value of consumer surplus can be computed in a manner similar to the present
value of a ﬁrm (described above in Subsection 2.4).
4.1. Antitrust Policies Governing Licensing
Antitrust policy occasionally limits licensing from potential product market entrants to in-
cumbents on the grounds that entry would improve product market competition.10 In our
model, the welfare impacts of such policies depend critically on how they eﬀect entry into
the innovation race. If allowing licensing induces entry into the race, then industry invest-
ment rises. The social beneﬁt of faster innovation may outweigh the social loss from market
power in the product market. The results suggest that antitrust authorities should assess
the impact of forbidding licensing on incentives to innovate.
10Gilbert and Tom (2001) provide an excellent summary of U.S. antitrust agencies’ policies and practices
in recent cases involving innovation concerns.
23Relative bargaining power is important. In Subsection 2.4 we argued that the incentive
provided by the eﬃciency eﬀect is reduced when licensing is allowed; the V
j
i terms rise
for every incumbent i. Further, if the licensee has all of the bargaining power, then the
replacement eﬀects do not change. This yields a general conclusion: if the licensee has all of
the bargaining power, then licensing reduces investment. We also noted that as the licensor’s
bargaining power rises, the replacement eﬀect leads to increased innovation from ﬁrms other
than the licensee. The game is one of strategic complements; thus, the licensee also increases
its investment. This eﬀect oﬀsets the impact of the eﬃciency eﬀect. The licensor with more
bargaining power can appropriate more proﬁts for itself, and this yields greater incentives
to enter the race and invest.
Considering relative bargaining power yields a policy conclusion that is counter to the
current approach of the U.S. antitrust agencies. The agencies view high payments from the
licensee to the licensor as a sign that the licensor could have entered the product market.
The agencies’ pro-competitive stance causes them to prefer entry to licensing, and as a
result they frown on licensing agreements with high payments to the licensor. In contrast,
our model suggests that licensing agreements where the licensor obtains a higher percentage
of the gains from trade (a higher payment) may be associated with more competition in the
race, greater investment in innovation, and higher welfare.
Payments to the licensor are higher if the licensor can proﬁtably enter, but our analysis
suggests that the ability of a ﬁrm to enter does not imply that entry generates higher welfare
than the best licensing agreement. After the innovation is available, welfare is maximized
by improving product market competition, and this is what the agencies focus on. In doing
so, they ignore the impact of their policies on the incentives to innovate in the ﬁrst place.
4.2. Policies Governing Employee Non-Compete Agreements
A non-compete agreement, or covenant not to compete, is a contract entered into by an
employee and employer whereby upon termination of employment the employee is restricted
from competing in the same business as the employer for a particular period of time in a
certain geographical location. Non-compete agreements are designed to protect employers
from unfair competition caused by former employees working for a competitor or starting
24a similar business. This type of competition is deemed unfair because the former employee
can use conﬁdential knowledge of the former employer to gain an advantage in the market.
A small minority of states do not enforce non-compete agreements unless they are used in
conjunction with a sale of a business, dissolution of a partnership, or other very specialized
cases. This is important for our analysis because the vast majority of the spin-outs in the
rigid disk drive industry were initially located in California, the most prominent non-enforcer.
Thus, the rigid disk drive industry shows what can happen if employee mobility is permitted.
In typical racing models, an increase in the number of ﬁrms in the race causes a winner
to emerge sooner (Reinganum 1989). Our model is no exception to this general result,
which implies that spin-outs lead to higher industry investment and higher welfare. Thus,
in our model, preventing spin-outs through non-compete agreements or other means lowers
total welfare, primarily because it reduces the present value of consumer surplus. However,
preventing spin-outs may increase total ﬁrm value as the incumbents avoid having to compete
with the spin-out entrants in the innovation race. Thus, ﬁrms may have an incentive to
prevent spin-outs even when doing so reduces total welfare.
Our numerical results suggest that if the business stealing eﬀects of the new product
are small then total ﬁrm value may rise when spin-outs enter the innovation race. This
occurs because the positive eﬀect of generating additional customers outweighs the negative
eﬀect of enhanced competition in the product market. This is most likely to happen when
the spin-out intends to pioneer a new product generation. This suggests that non-competes
would have the primary objective of preventing competition in races to improve quality in
existing product generations. When total ﬁrm value rises, a prospective spin-out might be
able to buy out its non-compete agreement by oﬀering its parent a share of its value. Of
course, in reality it may not be possible for a ﬁrm to assess which type of innovation its
departing employee intends to pursue. In this case, the ﬁrm may refuse to renegotiate.
Thus, the presence of a non-compete agreement and the possibility of its enforcement may
deter employees from founding ﬁrms even when they do not intend to compete head-to-head
against their parents in the product market.
We ﬁnd little evidence of spin-outs forming to compete head-to-head with their parents
in the product market. Most of the spin-outs who grew to become large manufacturer-
25marketers were pioneers of new product generations or early followers. The most successful
of this group was Seagate, the ﬁrst ﬁrm to introduce a 5.25” drive and the market share
leader at the end of our sample. Of the group of spin-outs that grew large, only Quantum
entered to compete head-to-head against its parent. Quantum entered with a low end 8”
drive that imitated its parent Shugart Associates’ 8” drive.
On the whole, our theoretical and empirical results suggest that spin-out formation has
beneﬁcial eﬀects. Our results add to a growing literature that questions whether non-compete
agreements should ever be enforced. Gilson (1999) argues that California’s policy of not
enforcing non-compete agreements contributed to high employee mobility in Silicon Valley
and that this mobility encouraged growth. Cooper (2001) argues that non-competes are
a double-edged sword if all ﬁrms use them: each ﬁrm gets to keep its own employees but
cannot get other ﬁrms’ employees. The resulting labor allocation is sub-optimal.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a racing model with multiple product generations, product
innovation, spin-outs, and licensing. Tests of the model’s predictions using data from the
rigid disk drive industry (1977-97) provide empirical support. In the model, new product
generations pass through at most three stages. First, they are typically pioneered by spin-
outs and lagging ﬁrms. Second, old product generation leaders innovate or license to become
leaders in the new product generation. Third, as the new product generation matures,
eventually the new generation leaders maintain their leadership, either through innovation
or licensing. The ﬁrst stage is skipped if the business stealing eﬀect of the new generation
goods on the old generation goods is high immediately. The second stage is skipped if the
business stealing eﬀect is low initially, but the market for the new generation goods grows
rapidly thereafter, either through exogenous demand growth or rapid innovation.
The results clarify the role of spin-outs. If a spin-out innovates in a mature product
generation, it licences its innovation to a current market leader. Spin-outs only market and
grow large if they enter new product generations early on and those product generations
experience the favorable shocks that allow spin-outs to maintain their leadership in the face
26of potential entry from the old product generation leaders.
The theoretical and empirical results lead us to question certain aspects of U.S. antitrust
policies on licensing and policies governing employee non-compete agreements. Our model
suggests that in innovative environments, high product market concentration encourages
investment unless the leading ﬁrms’ market power prevents potential technology licensors
from appropriating any of the gains from trade from licensing. When the licensor is able
to appropriate gains from trade from licensing, high market power in the product market
raises potential licensors’ payoﬀs from innovating. This provides incentives to enter the
innovation race and invest and may increase welfare. Our model suggests that spin-outs
have beneﬁcial welfare impacts, and our empirical analysis supports this view. Spin-outs in
the rigid disk drive industry played the two roles described above: market pioneers in new
product generations and licensors in mature product generations.
Current U.S. antitrust policy in innovative environments, as expressed in the 1995 De-
partment of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property, tends to implicitly assume that the number of ﬁrms in the product
market today aﬀects the number of ﬁrms in future innovation races. Thus, a horizontal
merger between two innovative ﬁrms is questioned not just because it reduces product mar-
ket competition, but because it reduces competition for future innovations. Our analysis
suggests that if spin-out formation is possible then this concern is unwarranted.
Extending the model to incorporate multiple innovations and diﬀusion would be a useful
next step. Our model focuses on innovations that advance the technological frontier within a
product generation or pioneer a new product generation. To simplify the analysis, we ignore
introductions of less-than-frontier products and improvements that allow laggards to catch
up with current industry leaders. We also ignore future innovations. Evidence shows that
it is diﬃcult to forecast the success of new product generations, but if it is possible to do
so then future payoﬀs might dominate the short-term concerns we focus on. Incorporating
these factors should yield insights into strategy and policy.
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29Table 1.  Storage Capacity Leaders in the 8” Diameter 
 Year 
Number  of:  79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 
                    
Leaders    6  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8  5  4  1 
Leaders who are Old Generation 
Large Manufacturer/Marketers   1 3 4 4 4 6 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 2 2 1 
Leaders who are New Generation 
Large Manufacturer/Marketers   0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 





Table 2.  Storage Capacity Leaders in the 5.25” Diameter 
 Year 
Number  of:  80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 
                   
Leaders    3  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8  7 
Leaders who are Old Generation 
Large Manufacturer/ Marketers   0 2 0 2 1 3 0 4 5 4 7 5 6 6 3 2 2 
Leaders who are New Generation 
Large Manufacturer/ Marketers   0 0 0 0 2 4 5 2 3 2 3 2 1 2 3 3 2 






Table 3.  Storage Capacity Leaders in the 3.5” Diameter 
 Year 
Number  of:  83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 
                
Leaders    3  5  10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Leaders who are Old Generation Large 
Manufacturer/Marketers   1 0 4 2 2 5 4 7 7 6 6 7 8 7 
Leaders who are New Generation Large 
Manufacturer/Marketers   0 1 0 1 3 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 
Leaders  who  are  Recent  Entrants  2 4 6 4 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1  
 
Table 4.  Storage Capacity Leaders in the 2.5” Diameter 
 Year 
Number of:  88  89  90  91  92 93 94 95 96 
           
Leaders    1 2 5 9 9 9 10  10  10 
Leaders who are Old Generation Large 
Manufacturer/Marketers   0 1 3 8 6 6 7 7 6 
Leaders who are New Generation Large 
Manufacturer/Marketers   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Leaders  who  are  Recent  Entrants  1 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 
 
 
Table 5.  Storage Capacity Leaders in the 1.8” Diameter 
  Year 
Number of:  91 92 93 94 95 96 
        
Leaders   1  7  10 10 4  4 
Leaders who are Old Generation Large Manufacturer/Marketers   0 4 6 5 1 0 
Leaders who are New Generation Large Manufacturer/Marketers   0 0 0 0 0 0 
Leaders who are Recent Entrants  1 3 4 3 1 1 
 Table 6.  OLS Regression: Firm Value on Market Share and Drive Quality, including only U.S. 
Firms that Specialize in the Rigid Disk Drive Industry 
The dependent variable is the natural log of market capitalization (White standard errors in parentheses) 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
Variable Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
    










Quality  0.58*** 
(0.11)  -  0.35*** 
(0.097) 


















































































































Number of Observations  181  142  137 
R-Squared 0.33  0.55  0.60 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.24  0.48  0.52 
*, **, and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
Year Dummies are included with 1983 as the base year Table 7: Investment and Licensing Under Alternative Values of nb 
  Ranking, from left to right, in order of who invests most 
nb  1 2 3 4 5 
      
nb =  1  Spin-out  2a 1b 1a 2b 
Licensing  No licensing occurs 
      
nb =  5  Spin-out  2a 1b 2b 1a 
Licensing  No licensing occurs 
      
nb =  10  Spin-out  2b 2a 1b 1a 
Licensing  No licensing occurs 
      
nb =  20  2b Spin-out  1a 1b 2a 
Licensing  Everyone licenses to 2b except 1b 
      
nb =  50  2b Spin-out  1a 1b 2a 
Licensing  Everyone licenses to 2b 
      
 
 
Table 8: Investment and Licensing Under Alternative Values of ω ω ω ω 
  Ranking, from left to right, in order of who invests most 
ω  1 2 3 4 5 
      
ω = 1.5  2a Spin-out  2b 1b 1a 
Licensing  No licensing occurs 
      
ω = 1.75  2a Spin-out  1b 1a 2b 
Licensing  Spin-outs license to 2a; other firms market 
      
ω = 2  2a Spin-out  1b 1a 2b 
Licensing  Spin-outs license to 2a; other firms market 
      
ω = 3  2b Spin-out  1a 1b 2a 
Licensing  Everyone licenses to 2b 
 
 Table 9. Summary Statistics. 1934 Observations 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
        
Dependent Variable:         
        
The Firm Innovates in the Young Generation 
This Year  0.082 0.27  0.00  1.00 
        
Independent Variables:         
        
The Firm’s Drive Quality Last Year*  -0.054  0.97  -2.07  4.45 
The Megabyte Ratio Last Year  0.33  0.077  0.22  0.61 
The Age of the Young Generation Last Year  5.34  3.78  0.00  16.00 
        
Dummy Variables:         
        
The Firm Produced Both the New and Old 
Generations Last Year  0.27 0.44  0.00  1.00 
The Firm Produced Only the New Generation 
Last Year  0.33 0.47  0.00  1.00 
The Firm Produced Only the Old Generation 
Last Year  0.40 0.49  0.00  1.00 
* The Firm’s Drive Quality is measured using its quality in the young generation if it 
produces the young generation; otherwise its quality in the old generation is used Table 10.  Probit Model: Innovation in Young Product Generations 
The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the firm introduces a young generation drive 
with a higher areal density than last year’s best drive in the diameter (standard errors in 
parentheses) 
 Equation  1 
  Probit Estimation  Marginal Effects 
Variable Coefficient  Coefficient 
















































Number of Observations  1934   
Log Likelihood  -440.49   
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
Year Dummies are included with 1983 as the base year 
 
Year Effects are reported on the following page Table 10, continued 
  Probit Estimation  Marginal Effects 
Variable Coefficient  Coefficient 




































































 Table 11.  Early Movers 
(Firms are in alphabetical order in each category) 






























            
8”  BASF  Q4,  1979  No - 14”  -  -0.117  - 
  IBM  Q1,  1979  No - 14”  -  0.873  - 
 International 
Memories 
Q1,  1979  Yes  Memorex  - 14”  - - 
  Micropolis  Q4,  1979  Yes  Pertec  - 14”  - - 
 New  World 
Computer 
Q3,  1979  No - None  -  -  - 
  Pertec  Q4,  1979  No - 14”  -  -1.378  - 
  Shugart  Q4,  1979  No - 14”  -  -0.940  - 
            
5.25” Computer 
Memories 
Q2,  1981  Yes  Pertec  - 8”  - 0.265 
 International 
Memories 
Q1,  1981  No - 8”  -  -0.830  - 
 New  World 
Computer 
Q3,  1980  No - 8”  -  -1.571  - 










  Seagate  Q3,  1980  Yes  Shugart,  - 14”  - -0.940 
  Tandon  Q4,  1980  No - None  -  -  - 
            




Q1, 1984  Yes  Alpha 
Data 




Q2,  1984  No - 5.25”  -  0.289  - 
  Rodime  Q3,  1983  No - 5.25”  -  1.067  - 
            
2.5” PrarieTek  Q4,  1988  Yes  Mini-
scribe 
- 3.5”  - 0.594 
            
1.8” Integral 
Peripherals 
Q3,  1991  Yes  PrarieTek  - 2.5”  - 0.707 
An early mover is defined to be a firm that introduces a drive in the diameter within 3 quarters after the first introduction date.  The 
introduction date is the date the product was first shipped.  Announced products that were still in the development stage, and had not 
shipped, are not included. Table 12. Summary Statistics for Entrants. 63 Observations 
 Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
        
Dependent Variables:         
        
The Firm Either Licenses or Becomes a 
Large Manufacturer/Marketer  0.35 0.48  0.00  1.00 
The Firm Becomes a Large 
Manufacturer/Marketer  0.21 0.41  0.00  1.00 
        
Independent Variables:         
        
The quality of the firm’s first drive  0.34  1.26  -1.57  4.45 
Age of the product generation when the 
entrant introduces its first drive 
(excluding 14” drives) 
2.63 2.73  0.00  10.00 
Age of the 14” generation when the 
entrant introduces its first drive, using 
1976 as year zero 
0.52 1.38  0.00  7.00 
        
Dummy Variables:         
        
The Firm is a Spin-Out  0.59  0.50  0.00  1.00 Table 13. Probit Model: Entrant Success vs. Failure. 
The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the entrant becomes a large manufacturer/marketer or 
sells technology (standard errors in parentheses) 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 (Spin-Outs 
Only) 












Variable  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 


















































Spin-Out -  -  0.75* 
(0.40) 
0.25* 
(0.13)  - - 
        
Number of 
Observations  63   63   37  
        
Log  Likelihood  -33.45   -31.62   -21.29   
Table 14.  Probit Model:  Type of Entrant Success. 
The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the entrant becomes a large manufacturer/marketer, and 
0 if it sells technology – failures are excluded (standard errors in parentheses) 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 (Spin-Outs 
Only) 












Variable  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 


















































Spin-Out -  -  0.28 
(0.73) 
0.11 
(0.28)    
        
Number of 
Observations  22   22   17  
        
Log  Likelihood  -13.28   -13.21   -10.10  